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Abstract
Frauchiger and Renner have recently claimed to prove that “Single-
world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent”.
This is contradicted by a construction due to Bell, inspired by Bohmian
mechanics, which shows that any quantum system can be modelled in
such a way that there is only one “world” at any time, but the predic-
tions of quantum theory are reproduced. This Bell-Bohmian theory
is applied to the experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner, and
their argument is critically examined. It is concluded that it is their
version of “standard quantum theory”, incorporating state vector col-
lapse upon measurement, that is not self-consistent.
1 Introduction
In 1984 John Bell [4] proposed an interpretation of quantum field theory
in which certain field variables always have definite values. This can be
generalised to any quantum system [8], giving a theory in which any chosen
set of commuting observables — the beables of the theory — always have
definite values, and yet the results of measurements are always distributed as
predicted by quantum mechanics. Bell’s theory was an extension of Bohmian
quantum mechanics.
Recently Frauchiger and Renner have declared that this is impossible [7].
They describe an experiment, the “extended Wigner’s friend experiment”, in
which, they claim, the predictions of quantum mechanics and the assumption
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that each measurement in the experiment has a unique result, together lead
to a contradiction. In this paper we examine the Bell-Bohmian description
of the extended Wigner’s friend experiment in an attempt to identify the
source of this contradiction.
The contents of the paper are as follows. Section 2 is an outline of the Bell-
Bohmian theory. Section 3 contains a description of the extended Wigner’s
friend experiment and a summary of the argument of Frauchiger and Renner.
In Section 4 we analyse the experiment in terms of Bell-Bohmian theory
and show how it avoids the contradiction found by Frauchiger and Renner.
Section 5 contains discussion, leading to the conclusion that the source of
the contradiction is the use of the projection postulate for measurements by
different agents.
2 Bell-Bohmian theory
This interpretation was inspired by Bohm’s interpretation of non-relativistic
many-particle quantum mechanics (see e.g. [6] p. 145), according to which
particles always have definite positions. The motion of the particles is gov-
erned deterministically by the wave function, which thus has the role of a
force acting on the system rather than a description of the state of the sys-
tem. To emphasise this role, Bell [3] calls the wave function a “pilot wave”.
This evolves according to the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation.
In Bell’s generalisation of this interpretation ([4], [8] p. 215), the many-
particle system can be replaced by any quantum system S, with states de-
scribed by vectors in a Hilbert space S, and the positions of the particles
replaced by any set of commuting variables, which are known as beables.
These are taken to have definite values, so the actual real state of the system
is described by a state vector in one of the simultaneous eigenspaces Si of
the beables (which are also known [8] as viable subspaces). The evolution
of this state is governed by another time-dependent vector, the pilot vector
|Ψ〉 ∈ S, which satisfies the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation with the
Hamiltonian H determined by the physics of the system. This pilot vector
can be decomposed into its components in the viable subspaces Si:
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
i
|ψi(t)〉 with |ψi(t)〉 ∈ Si,
and the real state at time t is taken to be one of the components |ψi(t)〉.
The real state changes in time, not deterministically as in the original
Bohmian mechanics, but stochastically: it makes transitions between the
preferred subspaces Si with transition probabilities given by
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Bell’s postulate: The real state of the system is one of the components
of the pilot state vector in one of the viable subspaces Si. If, at time t, the
real state is the component |ψi(t)〉 ∈ Si, then the probability that at time
t+δt the real state is |ψj(t+δt)〉 ∈ Sj is wijδt where the transition probability
wij is given by
wij =
{
2Re[(i~)−1〈ψj(t)|H|ψi(t)〉]
〈ψi(t)|ψi(t)〉 if this is ≥ 0
0 if it is negative
(2.1)
It follows from this [8]1 that the probability pi(t) that the real state of the
system at time t is |ψi(t)〉 is given by the Born rule (pi(t) = 〈ψi(t)|ψi(t)〉) at
all positive times t, if the probabilities are so given at the initial time t = 0.
This framework can be generalised still further [1, 10] to allow for the
possibility that the viable subspaces Si vary with time; it then includes the
modal interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Although this theory is indeterministic, it can be shown [9, 11] that
Bohm’s deterministic theory can be obtained as a continuum limit of Bell’s
original theory of the above form, in which he took the points of space to be
a discrete lattice.
3 The extended Wigner’s friend experiment
This section contains a description of the experiment designed by Frauchiger
and Renner [7] to demonstrate that any theory which is compliant with
quantum theory and describes a single world cannot be self-consistent. After
describing the experiment, we will outline the argument of Frauchiger and
Renner for this conclusion.
The experiment contains two experimenters F1 and F2 (Wigner’s friends),
who perform experiments on two two-state quantum systems, a coin C with
orthonormal basis states |head〉C and |tail〉C , and an electron S with spin
states | ↑〉S and | ↓〉S; it also contains Wigner W and his assistant A, who
can perform measurements on F1 and F2 as well as the coin C and the
electron spin S. Irrelevant degrees of freedom of the four experimenters are
suppressed, so each of them is regarded as having just two independent states,
which record the results of their measurements.
Before the experiment starts the coin is prepared in the state
√
1
3
|head〉+√
2
3
|tail〉.
1The proof in [8] refers to a slightly different, and less satisfactory, form of Bell’s
postulate, but it is easily adapted so as to apply to the form given here.
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At time t = 0 experimenter F1 observes the coin and records the result
r = “head” or “tail”, thereby being put into a memory state |r〉F1.
At time t = 1, F1 prepares the electron as follows: if the result of the
measurement at t = 0 was r = “head”, F1 prepares the electron in spin state
| ↓〉S; if r = “tail”, they prepare it in spin state | →〉S =
1√
2
(
| ↑〉S + | ↓〉S.
At time t = 2 experimenter F2 measures the spin z
1
2
~ of the electron
(z = ±) in the basis {| ↑〉, | ↓〉} and records the result, thereby being put
into a memory state |z〉F2 .
At time t = 3 Wigner’s assistant A measures F1, together with the coin,
in the basis
|ok〉F1C =
1√
2
(
|head〉F1 |head〉C − |tail〉F1|tail〉C
)
|fail〉F1C =
1√
2
(
|head〉F1 |head〉C + |tail〉F1 |tail〉C
)
,
and records the result x = “ok” or “fail”.
At time t = 4 Wigner measures F2, together with the electron, in the
basis
|ok〉F2S =
1√
2
(
|−〉F2| ↓〉S − |+〉F2| ↑〉S
)
|fail〉F2S =
1√
2
(
|−〉F2| ↓〉S + |+〉F1| ↑〉S
)
,
and records the result w = “ok” or “fail”.
At the end of the experiment Wigner and his assistant compare the re-
sults of their measurements. They repeat the experiment again and again,
stopping when they find x = w = “ok”. The question is whether it is possible
for the procedure to stop.
Frauchiger and Renner argue as follows. Let us assume that the experi-
ment is described by a theory T with the following three properties:
QT Compliance with quantum theory : T forbids all experimental results
that are forbidden by standard quantum theory.
SW Single world : T rules out the occurrence of more than one single
outcome if an experimenter measures a system once.
SC Self-consistency : T ’s statements about measurement outcomes are
logically consistent (even if they are obtained by considering the perspectives
of different experimenters).2
2This is the formulation of Frauchiger and Renner. Elsewhere they state that this
property “demands that the laws of a theory T do not contradict each other”. These are
not the same. If the laws of a theory T contradicted each other, then T simply would
not exist as a theory. But as stated here, SC is not a very interesting requirement: there
is no logical reason why statements existing in different perspectives should be consistent
(think of statements about the order of events in different frames of reference, in special
relativity). However, we show in this paper that even in this form there is no contradiction
between QT, SW and SC.
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Then we have the following implications:
1. Suppose that F1, in the measurement at t = 1, gets the result r =
“tail”. Then F1 prepares the electron spin S in the state | →〉S. When F2
measures S at t = 2, F2 and S are put into the entangled state |fail〉F2S. This
is not affected by A’s measurement of F1C at t = 3, so W , on measuring
F1C at t = 4, will, by QT, get the result w = “fail”. Thus
r(1) = tail =⇒ w(4) = fail (3.1)
(this allows for the possibility that the values of r and w might vary with
time). Since, by SW, the value of r(1) must be either “head” or “tail”, and
the value of w(4) must be either “ok” or “fail”, it follows that
w(4) = ok =⇒ r(1) = head. (3.2)
2. Suppose, on the other hand, that F1 gets the result r = “head” at
t = 1. Then the state of the electron spin after this measurement must be
| ↓〉. Hence, by QT, F2, in the measurement at t = 2, must get the result
z = −. Thus
r(1) = head =⇒ z(2) = −. (3.3)
3. Now consider F2’s measurement of z at t = 2. After F1’s preparation
of the electron spin, the state of F1, the coin and the electron is√
1
3
|head〉F1C | ↓〉S+
√
2
3
|tail〉F1C | →〉S =
√
1
3
|tail〉F1C | ↑〉S+
√
2
3
|fail〉F1C | ↓〉S.
Hence if the result of F2’s measurement of S is z = −, then the result of A’s
measurement of F1C at t = 3 must be x = “fail”:
z(2) = − =⇒ x(3) = fail. (3.4)
4. After F2’s measurement of the electron spin, the state of F1 and F2
(and their laboratories) is√
1
3
|tail〉F1|tail〉C|+〉F2| ↑〉S +
√
2
3
|fail〉F1C |−〉F2 | ↓〉S
= 1
2
√
3
(
|ok〉F1C |ok〉F2S−|ok〉F1C |fail〉F2S+|fail〉|ok〉F2S
)
+
√
3
2
|fail〉F1C |fail〉F2S.
This has non-zero coefficient of |ok〉F1C |ok〉F2S, so
x(4) = w(4) = ok is possible.
But W ’s measurement of F2S does not affect the state of A, so x(4) = x(3).
Thus in the measurements of A and W at t = 3 and 4,
x(3) = w(4) = ok is possible. (3.5)
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Now we have
w(4) = ok =⇒ r(1) = head by (3.2)
=⇒ z(2) = − by (3.3)
=⇒ x(3) = fail by (3.4)
which contradicts (3.5). Frauchiger and Renner conclude that no theory can
have all three properties SW, QT and SC.
4 Bell-Bohmian theory of the experiment
Bell-Bohmian theory assumes a pilot vector in the Hilbert space of the whole
experiment, evolving purely according to the unitary operator describing the
dynamics (i.e. with no application of the projection postulate after measure-
ments). In this it resembles Everettian quantum mechanics, but the meta-
physical interpretation is different, as described in Section 2. The Hilbert
space in question is
HF1 ⊗HF2 ⊗HA ⊗HW ⊗HC ⊗HS
whereHC andHS are two-dimensional, with orthonormal bases {|head〉, |tail〉}
and {| ↑〉, | ↓〉} respectively; and HF1,HF2,HA and HW are all 3-dimensional,
with bases labelled by r, z, x and w, each taking the two values described in
Section 2 and also a third value 0 to describe the “ready” state of the observer
before making any measurement. We take r, z, x and w to be the beables of
the system, which always have definite values. Thus the real state vector of
the system always lies in one of the 81 viable subspaces
|r〉F1|z〉F2 |x〉A|w〉W ⊗HC ⊗HS.
and is one of the projections of the pilot vector onto these subspaces.
In order to analyse the experiment, we need to be more precise about
the way in which F1 prepares the spin state after the coin toss at t = 0. I
will assume that before the coin toss, the electron spin is prepared in some
known initial state |0〉S ∈ HS; after the coin toss, F1 applies to the electron
either a unitary operator which takes |0〉 to | ↓〉 or one which takes |0〉 to
| →〉, according to the result of the toss. Then the real state vector before
the experiment starts is the same as the pilot state, namely
|0〉F1|0〉F2|0〉A|0〉W
(√
1
3
|head〉C +
√
2
3
|tail〉C
)
|0〉S.
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At t = 0, after F1’s measurement of the coin, the pilot vector becomes
|Ψ(0)〉 =
(√
1
3
|head〉F1C +
√
2
3
|tail〉F1C
)
|0〉S|0〉F2|0〉A|0〉W ,
where |head〉F1C = |head〉F1|head〉C and similarly for “tail”, but the real state
vector is one of the two summands in this. We will consider
|Φ(0)〉 = |tail〉F1C |0〉S|0〉F2|0〉A|0〉W .
At t = 1, after F1 has prepared the electron spin, the pilot state is
|Ψ(1)〉 =
(√
1
3
|head〉F1C | ↓〉S +
√
2
3
|tail〉F1C | →〉S
)
|0〉F2|0〉A|0〉W
The real state is one of the two summands in |Ψ(1)〉; we take
|Φ(1) =
√
2
3
|tail〉F1C | →〉S|0〉F2|0〉A|0〉W .
After F2’s measurement of S at t = 2, the pilot state becomes
|Ψ(2)〉 =
√
1
3
(
|head〉F1C |−〉F2S + |tail〉F1C |+〉F2S + |tail〉F1C |−〉F2S
)
|0〉A|0〉W ,
which has three components with definite values of r, z, x and w (viable com-
ponents), one of which is
|Φ(2)〉 =
√
1
3
|tail〉F1C |+〉F2S|0〉A|0〉W .
After A’s measurement of F1 and C at t = 3, the pilot vector becomes
|Ψ(3)〉 =
(√
1
6
(
− |ok〉F1C |ok〉A + |fail〉F1C |fail〉A
)
|+〉F2S〉
+
√
2
3
|fail〉F1C |fail〉A|−〉F2S
)
|0〉W
which has six viable components, one of which is
|Φ(3)〉 =
√
1
12
|tail〉F1C |+〉F2S|ok〉A|0〉W .
After W ’s measurement of F2 and S at t = 4, the pilot vector becomes
|Ψ(4)〉 =
√
1
12
(
|ok〉F1C |ok〉A + |fail〉F1C |fail〉A
)
|ok〉F2S|ok〉W
+
√
1
12
(
− |ok〉F1C |ok〉A + 3|fail〉F1C |fail〉A
)
|fail〉F2S|fail〉W
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which has sixteen viable components, one of which is
|Φ(4)〉 = −
√
1
24
|tail〉F1C |−〉F2S|ok〉A|ok〉W .
According to Bell-Bohmian theory, at all times Wigner, his assistant and
his two friends are in a single world with definite values of r, z, x and w, the
results of their measurements. But Frauchiger and Renner argue that this
leads to the contradictory implications (3.1), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5). We will
show, on the contrary, that in Bell-Bohmian theory it is possible that the
real state undergoes the transitions
|Φ(0)〉 −→ |Φ(1)〉 −→ |Φ(2)〉 −→ |Φ(3)〉 −→〉|Φ(4)〉.
It follows that in this theory the implication (3.1) (r(1) = tail =⇒ w(4) =
fail) does not hold: it is possible for F1 to get the result r = “tail” (and,
incidentally, to remain in a state registering this result) while W gets the
result w =“ok”.
To establish this, we will need to see what transitions between viable
states are allowed by Bell’s postulate, and for this we need a model of the
processes by which the measurements are made. The following is a general
theory of such a process. We consider an experimenter E measuring an
observable X on a system S, whose basis of eigenstates of X is {|1〉S, |2〉S},
and suppose that the process takes place as follows. The relevant states of
the experimenter are taken to be |0〉E, |1〉E, |2〉E, where |0〉E is the state of
the experimenter before the measurement, and |1〉E and |2〉E are the states
of the experimenter registering the results X = 1 and X = 2. In the course
of the measurement the joint state |1〉S|0〉E evolves to |1〉S|1〉E and the joint
state |2〉S|0〉E evolves to |2〉S|2〉E. We assume that each of these evolutions
is a simple rotation in the joint state space HE ⊗HS, lasting for a time τ :
|k〉S|0〉E −→ |Ψk(t)〉 = cosλt|k〉S|0〉E + sin λt|k〉S|k〉E
(k = 1, 2; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) where λ = pi/2τ . At times outside the interval [0, τ ],
the joint state of the system and the experimenter is assumed to be stationary
(with zero energy). This time development is produced by the Hamiltonian
H = i~λ
(
|1〉〈1|S ⊗
[
|1〉〈0| − |0〉〈1|
]
E
+ |2〉〈2|S ⊗
[
|2〉〈0| − |0〉〈2|
]
E
)
,
which is switched on at t = 0 and off at t = τ .
Suppose the system has just one beableM , the observation of the experi-
menter, with values (0, 1, 2), and suppose the initial state of the joint system
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is
(
a|1〉S+ b|2〉S
)
|0〉E. This has the definite value 0 for the beable M , so it is
both the real state vector for the joint system and the pilot vector at t = 0.
Then in the time interval [0, τ ] during which the measurement is proceeding,
the pilot state is
|Ψ(t)〉 = a|Ψ1(t)〉+ b|Ψ2(t)〉
= cosλt
(
a|1〉+ b|2〉
)
S
|0〉E + sin λt
(
a|1〉S|1〉E + b|2〉S|1〉E
)
and the real state of the joint system at any time in this interval is one
of the three states |Ψ(0)〉 = (a|1〉S + b|2〉S)|0〉E, |1〉S|1〉E or |2〉S|2〉E. It
can make a transition from |Ψ(0)〉 to |1〉S|1〉E or to |2〉S|2〉E because the
(real) matrix elements (i~)−1
(
〈k|S〈k|E
)
H
(
|k〉S|0〉E
)
(k = 1, 2) are both pos-
itive. It cannot make the reverse transitions because the matrix elements
(i~)−1
(
〈k|S〈0|E
)
H
(
|k〉S|k〉E
)
are negative, and it cannot make transitions
between |1〉S|1〉E and |2〉S|2〉E because the relevant matrix elements of H
are zero. Thus at time t = 0 the real state vector and the pilot vector co-
incide; between t = 0 and t = τ the pilot vector |Ψ(t)〉 changes smoothly
but the real state vector remains at its initial value |k〉S|0〉E until some un-
determined intermediate time at which it changes discontinuously to either
|1〉S|1〉E or |2〉S|2〉E and remains at that value until t = τ . A calculation of
the final probabilities from the transition probabilities as given by Bell yields
the expected values |a|2 and |b|2.
To examine the implication (3.1), we will apply this theory to the mea-
surements in the extended Wigner’s friend experiment. We will assume that
each of the measurements has duration τ < 1 before the time assigned to it
(e.g. A’s measurement “at time t = 3” occupies the interval [3 − τ, 3]), and
that each measurement consists of a simple rotation as described above.
If the result of F1’s measurement at t = 0 is r =“tail”, then the compo-
nent of |Ψ(0)〉 describing the actual world must be |Φ(0)〉. The pilot vector is
still |Ψ(0)〉. F1’s preparation of the electron spin at t = 1 is accomplished by
a unitary operator acting only on F1 and S, such that there are no matrix el-
ements of the Hamiltonian between states with different values of the beables
r, x, z, w; therefore the real state at t = 1 is |Φ(1)〉. The next measurement,
by F2 at t = 2, is driven by the Hamiltonian 1F1C⊗ (H2)F2S⊗1A⊗1W where
H2 = i~λ
(
|−〉F2S
(
〈↓ |S〈0|F2
)
−
(
| ↓〉S|0〉F2
)
〈−|F2S
+ |+〉F2S
(
〈↑ |S〈0|F2
)
−
(
| ↑〉S|0〉F2
)
〈+|F2S
)
. (4.1)
The pilot state during the measurement is cosλt|Ψ(1)〉 + sinλt|Ψ(2)〉; the
real state must therefore be one of the viable components of |Ψ(1)〉 or |Ψ(2)〉.
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Since this Hamiltonian has no matrix elements betweeen states containing
|head〉F1C and states containing |tail〉F1C , the only possible transitions from
|Φ(1)〉 are to the second or third term in |Ψ(2)〉, followed by transitions back
to |Φ(1)〉 or to other components of |Ψ(2)〉. But the Hamiltonian also has no
matrix elements between different viable components of |Ψ(2)〉, and the only
positive matrix elements of H/i~ are those corresponding to transitions in
the forward direction, so once a transition has been made to one of the three
terms in |Ψ(2)〉, there will be no further transitions during this measurement.
Thus if the real state after F1’s measurement has r = “tail”, this will still
be the case after F2’s measurement and the real state will be the second or
third term of |Ψ(2)〉, and both of these are possible. Thus there is a non-zero
probability that the real state evolves as |Ψ(0)〉 → |Φ(1)〉 → |Φ(2)〉.
A’s measurement of F1 and C at t = 3 is driven by the Hamiltonian
H3 ⊗ 1F2S ⊗ 1W where H3, acting in HF1C ⊗ HA, rotates |fail〉F1C |0〉A to
|fail〉F1C |fail〉A and |ok〉F1C |0〉A to |ok〉F1C |ok〉A. In terms of the viable states,
this is
H3 =
1
2
i~λ
(
|head〉+ |tail〉
)(
〈head|+ 〈tail|
)
F1C
⊗
(
|fail〉〈0| − |0〉〈fail|
)
A
+ 1
2
i~λ
(
|head〉 − |tail〉
)(
〈head| − 〈tail|
)
F1C
⊗
(
|ok〉〈0| − |0〉〈ok|
)
A
.
This Hamiltonian H has
〈Φ(3)|
H
i~
|Φ(2)〉 > 0,
and there are no positive matrix elements 〈φ|H
i~
|Φ(3)〉 for viable states |φ〉, so
the transition |Φ(2)〉 → |Φ(3)〉 is possible, and if it occurs the system remains
in the state |Φ(3)〉 until the next measurement.
W ’s measurement of F2 and S at t = 4 is driven by the Hamiltonian
1F1C ⊗ 1A ⊗H4 where H4 is the following operator on HF2S ⊗HW :
H4 = i~λ|ok〉〈ok|F2S
(
|ok〉〈0| − |0〉〈ok|
)
W
+i~λ|fail〉〈fail|F2S
(
fail〉〈0| − |0〉〈fail|
)
W
.
This has
〈Φ(3)|
H
i~
|Φ(4)〉 > 0,
and there are no positive matrix elements 〈φ|H
i~
|Φ(4)〉 for viable states |φ〉,
so the transition |Φ(3)〉 → |Φ(4)〉 is possible during W ’s measurement, and
if it occurs the system remains in the state |Φ(4)〉.
Thus it is possible that W and A both get the result “ok” for their
measurements, and this happens even though F1 records the result r = “tail”.
This contradicts the theorem of Frauchiger and Renner.
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5 Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to show that there is a counter-example
to the theorem that Frauchiger and Renner claim to prove. There is a theory
which is self-consistent, in which any experiment has only one result, and
which reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. It is not the purpose
of the paper to advocate this theory as a true description of the experiment,
but simply to show that it exists. This disproves the theorem. But what is
wrong with Frauchiger and Renner’s proof?
Let us examine the implication (3.1): if the result of F1’s measurement at
t = 1 is r = “tail”, then F1 acts on this information and calculates the future
development of the whole system by means of the Schro¨dinger equation,
with the measurement result “tail” as initial condition. This is to follow
the instructions of the quantum mechanics textbooks, so Frauchiger and
Renner describe it as “compliance with quantum theory”. It incorporates a
collapse of the state vector on measurement, otherwise known as the collapse
postulate. In Bell-Bohmian theory, on the other hand, although the result of
measurement determines the real state, the Schro¨dinger equation is applied
with a different initial condition, namely the pilot vector. This includes
a term corresponding to the result of measurement which did not actually
occur.
Naturally, these two procedures give different results. They are both
presented as “compliant with quantum theory”, but this cannot be true if
“quantum theory” has a well-defined meaning. This does not seem to be so.
The contradiction between the Frauchiger-Renner claim that “It is impossible
for any theory to obey (QT), (SW) and (SW)” and the claim of this paper
that “Bell-Bohmian theory obeys (QT), (SW) and (SW)” is due to different
meanings of (QT) in the two claims.
The version of quantum theory assumed by Frauchiger and Renner seems
appropriate for use by a particular observer, existing as part of the system
being described. If F1 at t = 1 sees the result “tail”, then it is reasonable
for F1 to use the state vector |Φ(1)〉, incorporating this result, to describe
the world they are part of. But does this mean that they should use this to
calculate what will happen at later times?
In the Frauchiger-Renner scenario F1 knows that the state vector at t = 0
is |Ψ(0)〉, which at t = 1 has evolved to the state containing a term corre-
sponding to the result of measurement which did not actually occur. F1 is
therefore in a position to include this term when calculating what can happen
at t = 5.
The rules of “standard quantum theory”, as understood by Frauchiger
and Renner, are appropriate for use in the more usual situation where the
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only available knowledge is the result of the experiment. In this situation
the only option is to apply the projection postulate. In principle, as the
FR experiment shows, the result of such a calculation will be different from
one in which the projection postulate is not applied. However, in a realistic
experiment with macroscopic apparatus, the difference between the results
of the two calculations will be utterly negligible.
In Bell-Bohmian theory, and in other interpretations of quantum theory,
the projection postulate is an approximation which is valid in many circum-
stances when a quantum system is entangled with a macroscopic system.
It is not a fundamental postulate of the theory (it is too ill-defined to be
anything of the sort), and there will be situations in which it does not ap-
ply. The extended Wigner’s friend experiment, as presented by Frauchiger
and Renner, is one such situation. The dimensions of the system, consisting
of a small number of qubits and qutrits, might be small enough to make it
possible to realise this experiment. It would be very surprising if the result
accorded with a calculation using the projection postulate.
Each of the agents in the experiment has a different perspective. This
will lead them to apply what Frauchiger and Renner call “standard quantum
theory” in different ways. Calculating at t = 0, they will obtain different
predictions for the results at t = 4. Each of F1, F2 and A will allow for the
two possible outcomes of their own measurement, with known probabilities,
and calculate the evolution after their measurement as if one result or the
other had definitely occurred; that is, they apply the projection postulate
to their own measurement while treating the other measurements as purely
quantum processes, with no projection. The purely quantum evolution of all
the measurements can be regarded as a “God’s eye view” of the experiment.
Wigner (who of course is God) makes this calculation, as there is no evolution
to be considered after his measurement.
The results of these calculations are as follows. The probabilities of the
four possible results of measuring (x, w) at t = 4, as calculated by the four
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agents at t = 0, are given in the following table:
(ok, ok) (ok, fail) (fail, ok) (fail, fail)
F1
1
12
5
12
1
12
5
12
F2
1
12
1
12
5
12
5
12
A 1
4
1
4
1
20
9
20
W 1
12
1
12
1
12
3
4
These calculations make no appeal to a “single-world” assumption. It is
only assumed that an observer who sees a result of an experiment sees just
one result. This is true, for example, in the “many worlds” interpretation,
in which each world contains just one result of the experiment. The contra-
diction between the predictions in (5) comes from the different applications
of the rules of standard quantum theory. This appears to show that of the
three assumptions QT, SW and SC of Frauchiger and Renner, SW is not
needed to obtain a contradiction: given the meaning they assign to “standard
quantum theory”, QT by itself is self-contradictory. A similar conclusion has
been reached by [2]
The extended Wigner’s friend experiment devised by Frauchiger and Ren-
ner remains of great conceptual value. It demonstrates that in a single-world
theory like Bell-Bohmian theory, possible experimental results which were
not realised in the actual world can still have an influence on the future of
the actual world. The same moral holds in interpretations of quantum theory
which do not postulate a single world in this sense, for example versions of
Everett’s relative-state theory in which the experience of a sentient physical
system is recognised as having its own reality [10]. Events which, for such an
observer, might have happened, but didn’t, can still affect real future events.
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